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Summary
Increasingly, Congress and the Administration are looking to utilize
nonproliferation assistance programs, including cooperative threat reduction, to help
reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  In the
FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized the Bush
Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union.  Thus far, the
Bush Administration has proposed that such funds could be used for retraining
weapons scientists in Iraq and Libya or for reducing uranium enrichment levels in
foreign research nuclear reactors.  This report, which will be updated as needed,
analyzes the range of possible applications of CTR funds and the kinds of assistance
might be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints
on possible assistance.
A key underlying issue is whether countries that pose particular risks are
prepared to provide adequate cooperation to achieve CTR objectives.  As many
observers have noted, CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other
countries.  A common factor must be the willingness of such states to cooperate.
Across the board, Congress may opt to consider domestic and international legal and
political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the nonproliferation regimes,
low levels of transparency exhibited by most of the potential recipient states, and the
lack of incentives for many of these states to pursue threat reduction measures.  In
addition, Congress may wish to consider whether potentially expanding the
geographic scope of CTR may have a negative effect on existing programs.  One
school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention.
Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus additionally on states
within the nexus of terrorism and WMD. 
This report complements CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat
Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union, and CRS Report
RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan.
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1 See CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S.
Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy Woolf, for a comprehensive review.  
2 “WMD” in this paper includes nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and excludes
the missiles that can delivery such weapons, and radiological weapons.  
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Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction:
A Survey of Options
Introduction
Nonproliferation assistance programs are a relatively new tool in combating the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  The Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) programs, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible
of these programs.  Begun in 1991, CTR initially aimed to help Russia meet its
START obligations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons.1  Within a decade, however,
CTR took on the goal of reducing the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).2  Experts realized that Russia needed to protect its Cold War
overhang of WMD materials, scientists, and equipment from those who might exploit
insider opportunities and who had incentives (particularly financial) to sell WMD
technology to anyone.  Now, however, many analysts support expanding cooperative
threat reduction programs beyond Russia to other geographic areas.  The Bush
Administration itself stated in early 2003, that it had “expanded the strategic focus
of the CTR program” to support the war on terrorism.3
This report surveys options for applying CTR programs to states that pose a
WMD and terrorism threat.  It describes potential recipients of such funding (those
states with WMD programs and terrorism problems); the kinds of assistance that may
be possible; potential legal, political, and technical constraints on assistance; and
potential costs and benefits to the United States of providing such assistance.  The
report begins with a brief review of why CTR programs might be considered
applicable to the threat of WMD terrorism and then takes a more detailed look at the
threat of WMD terrorism.  It reviews how certain kinds of CTR assistance might help
defuse the threat and presents some options tailored for specific countries.  The report
also looks at constraints involved in providing assistance and broader implications
of such assistance. 
Connecting  CTR and WMD Terrorism
The belief that terrorists were growing more interested in WMD grew after the
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, despite no obvious link, and continued to
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4 At the National Defense University, President Bush unveiled six other initiatives to combat
WMD: (1) expand the Proliferation Security Initiative to include “shutting down facilities,
seizing materials, and freezing assets”; (2) pass U.N. Security Council resolution requiring
all states “to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls and secure all sensitive
materials within their borders”; (3) encourage states to renounce uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing by ensuring reliable access, at reasonable cost, to fuel for civilian
nuclear reactors and make NSG enrichment- and reprocessing-related nuclear exports
available only to states that already have a fully operational capability; (4) make signature
of the Additional Protocol a prerequisite for any nuclear imports; (5) create a special
committee of the IAEA Board of Governors for safeguards and verification; and (6)
disqualify any state currently under investigation from serving on the IAEA Board.  See
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html].
grow as U.S. policy statements made further linkages.  In his January 2002 State of
the Union Address, President Bush highlighted Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “axis
of evil” states — those that support terrorism and also have WMD.  Later that year,
both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation highlighted the connection between terrorists and
WMD.  In 2003, the U.S. went to war with Iraq, justifying this action primarily on
the grounds that Iraq had WMD and a connection to terrorists associated with 9/11.
More recently, the exposure of the A.Q. Khan nuclear network in Pakistan, which
provided sensitive nuclear weapons technology (including a bomb design) to Libya,
Iran, and North Korea, has raised concerns not just about what could be traded
clandestinely, but also about potential terrorist access to WMD.  Khan’s sale of
technology to three state sponsors of terrorism, allegations of ties to a terrorist
organization, and the Pakistan government’s precarious relationship with terrorist
groups on its soil have prompted some to call for assistance to Pakistan to reduce the
threat of terrorist access to WMD.
A key strategy in limiting the risk of terrorist access to WMD is to cut off access
at the source.  For some, Russia should continue to be the main focus of efforts to
prevent and deter terrorists from acquiring WMD because of Russia’s vast Cold War
overhang of WMD technologies, material, and personnel.  Others see September
2001 as a watershed after which cooperation should be extended to problem states,
such as Pakistan, Syria, Libya, and Iran.  Still others see nonproliferation assistance
programs as a way to bring states outside the nonproliferation regime, like North
Korea and Pakistan, under some restraints.
The Bush Administration has advocated the use of traditional and new tools to
counter WMD proliferation, including interdiction, preemption, diplomacy, and
assistance.  In a key nonproliferation speech on February 11, 2004, President Bush
introduced seven new initiatives, including expanding CTR.  In particular, Bush
noted that such funds could be used for retraining weapons scientists in Iraq and
Libya or for reducing uranium enrichment levels in foreign research nuclear reactors.4
A few underlying issues may influence the ultimate success of CTR-like
approaches.  One is the “cooperative” element in the U.S. relationship with the state
in question.  A state’s willingness to cooperate may hinge on calculations of the
WMD program’s importance to its security and other geopolitical considerations.  A
second issue may be that state’s perception of CTR assistance — is this just another
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5 In a separate action, Rep. Schiff introduced H.R. 2063, for the same purpose, which
remains under consideration by the House International Relations Committee.  Schiff’s bill
specifically named Pakistan, India, North Korea, China, Iran, and Iraq as potential recipients
of CTR assistance.
6 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’
Heel (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 30.
name for arms control, U.S. unilateralism, or bribery?   More broadly, there is the
question of whether globalizing CTR may spread resources thinly at a time when
there is still significant work to be done in Russia and the former Soviet states. 
Congressional Role
Since 1991, Congress has authorized CTR funds specifically for use in the
Soviet Union, and later, in Russia and former Soviet Union (FSU) states.  Before
FY2004, agencies used other sources of funding for nonproliferation assistance
programs applied outside of Russia and the FSU.  With the FY2004 budget cycle, the
Bush Administration can now use $50 million of unobligated CTR funds outside the
FSU.  The “Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act” was passed as part of the FY2004 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136)  to “assist the United States in resolution
of critical emerging proliferation threats and to permit the United States to take
advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals.”  The
final language of the act requires the President to determine, and notify Congress in
writing within 10 days after obligating funds, that the: (a) project/activity will help
the United States in the resolution of a critical emerging proliferation threat; or
permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing
nonproliferation goals; (b) Department of Defense is the government agency most
capable of carrying out the project/activity; and (c) project/activity will be completed
in a short period of time.  Conferees noted that they expected the President to assign
projects to the most appropriate agencies.5    Although the House conditions appear
to orient this funding toward short-term programs that emerge (like the case of
Libyan and Iraqi weapons scientists), Congress may wish to consider longer term
implications of these sorts of programs.
Background
The threat of terrorist access to WMD is a relatively new concern for
nonproliferation experts.  First, the nonproliferation regime has focused on
controlling ingredients at the source as the most effective first line of defense.  This
already addresses two kinds of terrorist threats: that an insider might collaborate to
sell or give a terrorist some materials and that terrorists might seek to steal materials
themselves from facilities.  Second, the regime has controls for transfers to anyone
(not just states) outside the regime.  Third, apart from Aum Shinrikyo’s use of sarin
gas on the Tokyo subway, few non-state actors have conducted or attempted to
conduct an attack with a functional nuclear, chemical or biological weapon.6
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7 Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003. Report pursuant to Section 721 of the FY1997
Intelligence Authorization Act (hereafter referred to as CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition,
January-June 2003).  See also CRS Report RL31332, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The
Terrorist Threat.
8 CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use:
Placing the Threat in Context.
9 U.S. State Department, Patterns in Global Terrorism 2002, Washington DC.  Available
at [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/pdf].
10 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html]. 
11 CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2002.
On the other hand, the perception of an increased threat of terrorist use of WMD
has grown since the September 2001 attacks on the United States.  There is evidence
that Al Qaeda assigned a high priority to acquiring a WMD capability and some
observers believe that chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities are
increasingly available.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has estimated that
“the threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)
materials remained high” in 2003 [note the use of the word “materials,” not
weapons].  Yet, the CIA also concluded that “terrorist groups probably will continue
to favor long-proven conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings.”7  In
addition, the number of terrorist and CBW incidents have declined.8  In Patterns of
Global Terrorism 2002, the State Department reported that there was a 44% decline
in terrorist acts in 2002 from 2001, and that the number of incidents was the lowest
since 1969.9  Nevertheless, analysts both inside and outside the U.S. government
have focused growing attention on the potential “nexus of WMD and terrorism”
threat.
The Threat: Nexus of WMD and Terrorism
According to the 2002 National Security Strategy, “rogue states” are those that:
brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the
personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten
their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they
are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along
with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or
offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor
terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the
United States and everything for which it stands.10 
The CIA has reported a growing concern that traditional state recipients of
WMD technology “may follow North Korea’s practice of supplying specific WMD-
related technology and expertise to other countries or non-state actors.”11  When
those states are designated state sponsors of terrorism, there is the possibility they
may provide the terrorist organizations that they support with WMD materials or
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weapons.  While there is very little evidence to support this assumption, it cannot be
ruled out.  Because these countries tend to be “pariah” states, however, they may
offer few footholds for cooperation.  Nonetheless, some of the new and reinvigorated
cooperation in counterterrorism since 2001 may help spur cooperation in other areas.
Equally risky is the category of states that have terrorist activity on their soil and
WMD programs.  These pose a different kind of risk: that terrorists may gain access
to WMD without the authority or knowledge of the host government, either through
insider ties or through instability engendered by terrorist activity. 
Table I below cross-references WMD capabilities and terrorist activities.
Estimates of WMD capabilities are drawn from semiannual CIA unclassified reports
to Congress (per Section 721 of the FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act),
“Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.  For the
purposes of analysis, terrorism activity is divided into “state sponsors” of terrorism
(per Section 6j of the Export Administration Act of 1979); and those with activity
(terrorist incidents) on their soil.  It could be argued that the list of state sponsors of
terrorism corresponds poorly with the threat because most of the formal state
sponsors of terrorism provide support, or used to provide support, for older groups
and not necessarily those that appear to be most threatening now.  However, such a
list provides a starting point for analysis.
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Algeria —— Research? Suspected  Activity Y Y Y
Cuba —— Reported  — State sponsor Y Y Y
Egypt —— R&D Likely Activity Y N   Y*
India Known —— Has Had Activity N Y Y
Indonesia —— —— Sought Activity  Y Y Y
Iran Seeking Likely Has Had State sponsor Y Y Y
Iraq Seeking Known Known State sponsor Y N Y
Israel Known Likely
R&D
Likely Activity N   Y* N
Kazakhstan —— —— Suspected —— Y Y N
Libya** Ended Declarednone Ended State sponsor Y Y Y
Myanmar —— —— Likely —— Y Y* Y*
North Korea Known? Likely Known State sponsor
N N Y
(NPT withdrawal)
Pakistan Known —— Likely Activity N Y Y
Saudi Arabia —— —— Suspected Activity Y Y Y
South Africa  Ended Ended Suspected —— Y Y Y
South Korea Ended —— Suspected —— Y Y Y
Sudan —— —— Suspected State sponsor Y Y Y
Syria —— Seeking Known State sponsor Y  N   Y*
Taiwan Ended Suspected Likely  — N N Y
Thailand —— —— Suspected Activity Y Y Y
Vietnam —— —— Likely —— Y Y Y
Yugoslavia
/Kosovo —— —— Suspected Activity Y Y Y
Sources: CRS.  Estimates of WMD capabilities are drawn from semiannual CIA Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions (per Section 721 of FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act.)
Notes:
Y = party to treaty NPT = Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Y* = signed but not ratified treaty CWC = Chemical Weapons Convention
N  = not party to treaty BWC=Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
**Libya renounced its WMD programs on December 19, 2003.
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12 See CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
13 CIA’s unclassified responses to Questions for the Record from the Worldwide Threat
Hearing of February 11, 2003, dated August 18, 2003, p. 145 [hereafter CIA unclassified
responses to Worldwide Threat Hearing 2003].
14 U.S. State Department, Patterns in Global Terrorism 2002.
15 See CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments.
16 U.S. National Statement, First Review Conference of the CWC; Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker; April 28, 2003.
State Sponsors of Terrorism
Per Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405
(j)), the U.S. Secretary of State currently designates seven countries as state sponsors
of terrorism:  Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.  
Cuba. Cuba was first designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1982.  Although
it has ratified all 12 counterterrorism conventions, it has remained opposed to the
U.S. global war on terrorism.12  The CIA judged in August 2003 that “We have no
credible evidence, however, that the Cuban government has engaged in or directly
supported international terrorist operations in the past decade, although our
information is insufficient to say beyond a doubt that no collaboration has
occurred.”13 
The Administration’s assertions concerning Cuba’s WMD programs, which
some observers dispute, focus on limited biological weapons research and
development.  Construction at the Juragua nuclear facility (two incomplete Russian
nuclear power reactors) was indefinitely postponed in 1997.
Iran. According to the State Department, Iran “remained the most active state
sponsor of terrorism in 2002.”14  Although it is a member of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), many observers believe that it has active
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.  Many have believed for years
that Iran’s desire to acquire advanced nuclear fuel cycle capabilities really masks a
nuclear weapons program.  As a result of intensified inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran reported in late 2003 that it enriched small
quantities of uranium using centrifuge and laser techniques, and separated a small
quantity of plutonium. On December 18, 2003, Iran signed an Additional Protocol
to its nuclear safeguards agreement that will enhance reporting and inspection
activities, yet significant concerns remain that Iran continues to withhold information
from the IAEA about its nuclear activities.  The IAEA Board of Governors will meet
again in June 2004 to resolve issues related to Iran’s compliance with the NPT.15
The United States believes that Iran “continues to seek chemicals, production
technology, training, and expertise from abroad...[and that it] has stockpiled blister,
blood, and choking agents,” and  aired these concerns at the First Review Conference
of the CWC in April 2003.16  Iran, which ratified the CWC in 1997, first admitted it
had a past CW program in 1998, but it has not acknowledged its use of chemical
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17 U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997.
18  CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003. 
19 INR’s (Assistant Secretary Carl Ford) unclassified responses to questions submitted for
the record from the February 11, 2003 Worldwide Threat Hearing, p. 191, April 30, 2003.
20 See also CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Violations,
and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report RL31671, Iraq: UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
21 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-15.html].
22 U.S. Department of State, Background Notes for Libya at [http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm]; and Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 80.
23 David Mack, vice president of the Middle East Institute, in an interview with the PBS
(continued...)
weapons against Iraq.  Iran also reportedly provided Libya with chemical weapons
that were later used in Chad.17  The CIA has reported to Congress that Iran has
continued to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from
Chinese entities.  The CIA also believes that Iran has stockpiled blister, blood, and
choking agents and probably has nerve agents.  In addition, the CIA reported in 2003
that Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical material, equipment and expertise,
from which its offensive BW program could have benefitted.18  The State
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported in April 2003 that “Iran
probably has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited
ability to weaponize them.”19
Iraq.  Iraq’s status, both in terms of WMD capabilities and as a state sponsor of
terrorism, may change dramatically as a result of the recent war.  At this writing, no
WMD have been found but any weapons or capabilities that might be found in the
future undoubtedly will be destroyed.  Iraq obviously may be encouraged to join the
CWC once a sovereign government is established.20  Iraq is a member of the NPT
and the BWC.
Although Iraq is still formally a state sponsor of terrorism, President Bush issued
a presidential memorandum on May 7, 2003 suspending the Iraq Sanctions Act and
making inapplicable, with respect to Iraq, Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act and any other provisions of law that apply to countries that have supported
terrorism (other than section 586E of P.L. 101-513).21  In effect, Iraq was removed
from the “other terrorist list,” Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act.
Libya.  Libya was designated a state sponsor of terrorism at the list’s inception
in 1979. The U.S. State Department noted in 2002 that “there have been no credible
reports of Libyan involvement in terrorism since 1994,” but also that Libya’s past
record of terrorism continued “to hinder Qadhafi’s efforts to shed Libya’s pariah
status.”22 At issue also is Libya’s harboring of terrorists.  Since 2002, Libya has been
a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and
according to one observer, “there has been a considerable amount of cooperation
between Libya and the United States in terms of intelligence exchanges” since
September 11, 2001.23  Moreover, the CIA noted in August 2003 that “Libya appears
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to have curtailed its support for international terrorism, although it may maintain
residual contacts with some of its former terrorist clients.”24  
In 2003, the Bush Administration noted “we have long been concerned about
Libya’s longstanding efforts to pursue nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
ballistic missiles.”25 In contrast to credible reports of Libya’s chemical weapons
capability (CW use against Chad in the 1980s and facilities at Rabta and Tarhuna),
and ballistic missile development, most observers were not overly concerned about
its nuclear efforts (although longstanding, not very successful) or potential biological
weapons research.  Not surprisingly, voluntary inspections by U.S. and British
officials of Libya’s programs this year revealed a CW stockpile of 10-year-old
mustard gas and a handful of centrifuge equipment (for uranium enrichment),
according to press reports.26  Libya is a member of the BWC and the NPT, but until
recently, had refused to sign the CWC.
This past year, however, has been a watershed in Libya’s cooperation in both
areas. Libya proposed a sequential process in 2003 by which the families of victims
of the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988 would be compensated, in return for a lifting of
U.N. sanctions, U.S. sanctions, and removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism
list.  U.N. sanctions were lifted in September 2003, leaving U.S. sanctions and
removal from the terrorism list.27  Some have seen Libya’s December 2003 pledge
to eliminate its WMD programs as another significant step toward normalizing
relations with the United States, but President Bush’s December 19, 2003 statement
pointedly noted that Libya must also fully engage in the war against terror.
Specifically, Libya pledged in December 2003 to: eliminate all elements of
chemical and nuclear weapons programs; eliminate all chemical weapons
stocks/munitions and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention; declare all
nuclear activities to the IAEA, accept “international inspections” to ensure
compliance with the NPT and sign the Additional Protocol; eliminate ballistic
missiles with ranges exceeding Missile Technology Control Regime standards
(300km; 500kg payload); and allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify
these actions.28  U.S. and British officials, as well as IAEA staff, conducted
inspections toward the end of 2003.  On February 5, 2004, Libya signed the CWC
and destruction of its CW program began on February 27, 2004.  On March 10, 2004,
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Libya signed the Additional Protocol to its nuclear safeguards agreement, but
removal and destruction of nuclear-related items began in January 2004.
North Korea.  North Korea was added to the terrorism list on January 20, 1988
and remains on the list although it is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts
since 1987.  According to the State Department, North Korea did not take substantial
steps to cooperate in the war on terrorism in 2002.  North Korea has become party
to 6 of the 12 international conventions.  However, it has sold conventional weapons
to several terrorist groups and reportedly continues to provide safe haven to some
terrorists, which is one of the conditions that puts a country on the list.29
North Korea’s WMD programs are a high priority threat for the Bush
Administration.  Its nuclear program and ballistic missile capabilities are well-
documented; it has a known chemical weapons capability and is considered likely to
have a BW capability.30  North Korea withdrew from the NPT in April 2003 and has
been found to have repeatedly violated U.S. missile nonproliferation laws.
Statements from North Korea on its capabilities are a bit misleading: in 2003, North
Korea  repeatedly stated that it has reprocessed all its spent fuel, that it has nuclear
weapons, and on one occasion, North Korean officials threatened to export nuclear
weapons.31  In January 2004, North Korean officials reportedly told an unofficial U.S.
delegation that they did not have nuclear weapons or a uranium enrichment
program.32  There is no public evidence that North Korea  has offered nuclear
material for sale, whether produced in the early 1990s or more recently.
Sudan. Sudan has ratified all twelve international counterterrorism conventions
and publicly foresworn support for terrorism.  In 2001, the United Nations lifted its
sanctions in recognition of Sudan’s positive steps against terrorism.  In addition,
Ambassador Black, the State Department’s counterterrorism coordinator,
underscored Sudan’s cooperation in 2003, including improved access to individuals
of interest, financial institutions, and records.  Nonetheless, the CIA estimated in
2003 that al Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, PIJ,
and Hamas continued to operate in Sudan.33 The FBI reportedly believes that Sudan
is a “permissive environment and a transit point for Islamic extremists who engage
in recruiting, training, fund-raising, and logistical support for terrorist activity
worldwide.”34  
Sudan is suspected of having a chemical weapons program, despite being a party
to the CWC.  The most recent CIA assessment states that “although Sudan has
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aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about
its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad.”35 Sudan is not thought to have
nuclear or biological weapons programs.
Syria.  According to the State Department’s Patterns in Global Terrorism 2002
report, despite some cooperation on al Qaeda, Syria continues to host and support
terrorist groups, including Hezballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Among
other things, it hosts offices in Damascus for Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas
and permits resupply flights of Hezballah through its territory.  While in Damascus
in May 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned Syria to withdraw support from
terrorist organizations.  On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed into law P.L.
108-175, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, which
would impose sanctions on Syria until it ceases support for terrorist groups, ends its
occupation of Lebanon, ends WMD development, and ceases facilitating terrorist
activity in Iraq.  At this writing, Administration officials have hinted in
Congressional testimony that sanctions would be implemented soon.36
With respect to WMD, Syria has a known CW program and is believed to be
seeking biological weapons.  According to one press account, “It is the worst kept
secret in the Middle East that Damascus has one of the largest stockpiles of chemical
agents in the region.”37 Syria is not a party to the CWC, and has signed but not
ratified the BWC.  Syria also has an arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles.  It is a party to the NPT and, despite having signed nuclear cooperation
agreements with Russia in 1998 and 2000, few believe it has serious nuclear weapons
aspirations.
States with Terrorist Activity and WMD Programs  
In addition to the state sponsors of terrorism that have WMD programs, there are
other states with WMD programs that have terrorist activity on their soil.  Pakistan,
India, and Israel fit in this category.  The fact that none is a member of the NPT could
limit cooperation in the nuclear area.  All are members of the CWC, but many
observers believe Israel and Pakistan have covert CW programs.  India declared its
CW program in 1997, after initial declarations that it had no CW.  India has already
destroyed 20% of its CW stockpile and is obligated to destroy 45% of its stockpile
by 2004 and the rest by 2007.   Pakistan and India are members of the BWC and are
not thought to have BW programs; Israel has not joined the BWC and many believe
that it has carried out BW research and development.
In addition to those three, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are likely concerns
for CW programs and potential terrorist access; of those three, only Egypt is not a
party to the CWC.  Egypt is also a concern because it is known to have a BW
program; it has signed but not ratified the BWC.  The Defense Intelligence Agency
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reported in April 2003 that “we do not believe that Saudi Arabia is trying to acquire
biological or chemical agents or weapons from foreign sources.”38
How Significant Is the Nexus? 
Two factors should be considered in assessing the severity of a threat of terrorist
access to WMD: intention and opportunities.  First, terrorists operating in certain
countries that have WMD programs do not necessarily have an interest in acquiring
WMD.  Most of the terrorist groups with an interest in WMD tend to be more
internationally rather than domestically focused.39  To date, the Kurdistan Worker’s
Party (PKK), Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Aum Shinrikyo have demonstrated interest in
developing weapons of mass destruction.  Although the following countries have
terrorist activities on their soil, terrorists active on their soil have not demonstrated
WMD intentions: Algeria, India, Thailand, and Yugoslavia/Kosovo.  
Second, the states in question present different opportunities for terrorists to gain
access. In some cases, facilities may be remotely located, with good surveillance
capabilities and good security.  In addition, some facilities may be under military
control.  The level of security in a country like North Korea or Israel may be much
higher than, for example, in Algeria or Egypt.  Even in a country like Russia, which
many observers believe presents significant opportunities for materials theft, the
ability of terrorists to acquire material is not a given.  The CIA has judged that none
of the sixteen seizures of Russian weapons-usable material since 1992 was connected
to terrorists.40  On the other hand, the inability of a state to control either its people
or its territory (which may or may not be defined as a “failed” state) may present
opportunities for terrorists to move freely within a country and take advantage of
available resources.
On the other hand, the dual-use nature of many materials and technologies
associated with WMD may present terrorists with the ability to enhance their WMD
capabilities in countries that do not have an obvious WMD program.  In the case of
nuclear programs, for example, South Africa could be an attractive target for
terrorists because it had a nuclear weapons program and has HEU in metal form
under IAEA safeguards.  Of course, this attractiveness could be  mitigated by good
security and low terrorist activity on South African soil.  It appears that the Bush
Administration has taken the position that weapons-usable material, even if it is
under IAEA safeguards, may not be secure enough.41  One of the seven initiatives
highlighted in President Bush’s speech on nonproliferation on February 11, 2004 was
spending more money to bring back HEU from foreign countries and in May 2004,
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced the Global Threat Reduction
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Initiative, which would consolidate and accelerate several existing programs to
reduce this threat.
In large part,  the debate over Iran’s nuclear program and the role of Pakistan in
supplying uranium enrichment equipment and technology to Iran, Libya, and North
Korea has raised a decades-old debate about whether or not certain processes and
materials should be controlled internationally or banned altogether.  Not since the
Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s has international storage of plutonium, or
enriched uranium, or international control of enrichment and reprocessing facilities
been in vogue.  However, the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed
ElBaradei, suggested just such an approach in 2003, given the  situations in North
Korea and Iran.42  Although the details are not yet clear, President Bush himself
proposed in his February 11, 2004 speech at the National Defense University that
enrichment and reprocessing technology should not be spread any further than it
already is, and that export controls (national and multilateral agreements) should be
tightened to eliminate this possibility.43
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
 as Precedent
For over a decade, U.S. government agencies (particularly the Departments of
Energy and State) have spent nonproliferation assistance funds in countries outside
of the former Soviet Union (FSU).  Given the new ability to expend DOD’s CTR
funds outside of the FSU, however, it may be useful to examine the CTR program
for precedents, including the origin of the program, its objectives, kinds of work
funded, and problems encountered.
Congress enacted the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program in 1991, addressing, in Senator Lugar’s words, “the dominant international
proliferation danger: the massive nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
infrastructure of the former Soviet Union.”44   As the Soviet Union began to dissolve,
Russia  could not meet its obligations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons under the
START treaty.  Further, it became clear that the unraveling of the military industrial
complex could have security consequences that transcended the former Soviet
Union’s borders.  The initial legislation allowed the Department of Defense to use
unobligated funds to destroy and dismantle strategic nuclear weapons, make
transportation and storage of weapons no longer in the stockpile secure, and  convert
former WMD facilities and scientists.
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The CTR program had four key objectives:
! Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;
! Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection
with their destruction;
! Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these
weapons, their components, and weapons-usable materials; and
! Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to
weapons programs in other nations. 
Destruction and dismantlement activities included removing warheads,
deactivating missiles and eliminating launch facilities for strategic weapons under the
START I agreement.  Efforts to improve the safety, security, and control over nuclear
weapons and fissile materials have included providing storage containers, bullet-
proof blankets, secure rail cars, and building a plutonium storage facility at Mayak.
Demilitarization projects have included defense conversion projects and International
Science and Technology Center projects to help WMD scientists pursue work with
peaceful objectives and military-to-military contacts.
CTR programs have evolved and expanded over time, adjusting to Russian, FSU
states, and U.S. priorities, as well as to changing perceptions about which threats
posed the greatest risk.  The programs have also bowed upon occasion to
bureaucratic intransigence and practical considerations.  In one notable incident,
Department of Energy officials provided blankets to facility guards who were leaving
their posts to collect wood to build fires.  As the economy worsened in Russia in the
mid-1990s, CTR projects sought to provide alternative employment and sources of
income for unpaid or out-of-work WMD scientists.  Increased reports of attempts to
steal nuclear material highlighted the need for CTR to address material protection,
control and accounting (MPCA) measures for nuclear material, consolidation of
nuclear weapons and material, and secure transportation.  The United States
developed a practical approach: “quick-fixes,” like bars on windows, blast-proof
doors, fences, followed by a second stage that included more sophisticated security
measures like sensors, cameras, and personnel access measures. 45
The idea that two former adversaries could cooperate on such sensitive matters
as nuclear weapons and material security was radical in 1991, but so too was the
prospect of Russia’s WMD infrastructure unraveling.  The circumstances
surrounding CTR’s inception were unique: there was previous agreement under the
START treaty to destroy nuclear weapons, agreement on both sides that those
legitimate weapons needed to be secured before they were destroyed, and absence of
international inspections because of Russia’s status as a nuclear weapons state.
Russia had already agreed to destroy weapons — the only questions were how to
implement those reductions quickly and who would pay for them.  That Soviet
nuclear weapons had been targeted at the United States for so many years presented
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a compelling reason for the United States to help.  The same situation arose years
later when Russia signed the CWC and CTR funds were used to help destroy those
weapons.  An issue that could arise in the context of expanding CTR’s scope is
whether states with stocks of chemical weapons that are bound to destroy them by
2007 under the CWC (India and one anonymous state) will see this as an opportunity
to have their obligations paid for by the United States.
Kinds of Assistance
CTR assistance to states outside the FSU might use four types of programs:
those that help secure weapons, sites, materials, and personnel.  These correspond
roughly to the CTR missions of weapons destruction, ensuring transportation safety,
verifiably safeguarding against proliferation, and preventing diversion of scientific
expertise.  A few differences stand out from the Soviet case: 1) not all of the
countries of concern here have actual weapons; 2) some that do have weapons
programs belong to treaties that they may be currently violating; and 3) others that
have weapons programs have no international restrictions on them and may not have
any interest in giving up their weapons.  These differences will affect the kinds of
assistance the United States might want to provide to those countries and possibly
also the kinds of assistance it can legally provide. 
Weapons Security
U.S. assistance to most states is unlikely to emphasize weapons security as it did
with Russia and the FSU, primarily because potential recipient states will not be as
highly armed as Russia.  In the nuclear area, measures to improve the chain of
command and custody and secure transportation for nuclear warheads would likely
be highly controversial if extended to a state outside the NPT.  Nonetheless, some
observers have advocated assistance to improve nuclear weapons security with the
objective of ensuring that weapons could not be stolen or detonated by an
unauthorized person.  The simplest measures would be funding and training armed
guards.  However, potential recipient states are likely already aware of the advantages
of protecting their nuclear weapons.  Advice or equipment to ensure no unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons, such as permissive action links (PALs), would require access
to nuclear weapons, which is unlikely to be granted.  General information on PALs,
such as concepts or approaches, is publicly available and would not require access
to weapons. In all likelihood, however, India, Pakistan, and Israel probably have
exhausted public sources of information on that topic, but North Korea may not have.
Measures to ensure that command and control systems work would also help ensure
no unauthorized use, but could possibly enhance operational capabilities and
therefore may be undesirable.
Assistance in destroying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads is a different
matter.  It is assumed that the priority for BW and CW would be destruction, because
the respective treaties unequivocally ban those weapons.  Temporary security (weeks
or months, or perhaps years in the chemical weapons case) of biological and chemical
weapons security might be appropriate prior to destruction.  In the case of chemical
weapons, a non-state party to the CWC presumably could adhere to the guidelines set
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out under the CWC for destruction, or join the convention, as Libya has decided to
do.
Site Security
The CTR programs developed for Russia vary in their goals for site security
across the WMD spectrum.  For nuclear sites, security measures focused on helping
guard against the theft of weapons or materials by insiders or outsiders.  Site security
with respect to chemical weapons has focused primarily on destruction of weapons
capabilities.  Finally, site security for biological weapons has focused on
dismantlement, safety, and security at facilities for biological pathogens. 
Measures include perimeter security, such as gates and other barriers like barbed
wire and personnel identification systems, which can help minimize the risk of
unauthorized entry.  Sensors to detect unauthorized actions (movement, tampering)
can help against both insider and outsider threats. Measures to protect against inside
theft include checks on personnel leaving facilities (typically onerous without
technical detection measures for material or components), cameras in sensitive areas,
and accounting and access procedures.  Armed guards could help, as would
operational and administrative controls.
In Russia, U.S. officials toured sites and conducted vulnerability assessments.
In other cases, even perimeter visits could be viewed as too sensitive.  However, the
United States could offer information or briefings on how security is conducted at
sensitive facilities in the United States.  Such information would need to be presented
in general terms, not specific to particular facilities, to protect U.S. national security.
Ideally, assistance could cover types of requirements for personnel vetting and
training and development of a security culture.  Assistance of this kind in the nuclear
area is beginning to be provided under IAEA auspices to India and Pakistan.  If the
United States wanted to install cameras or sensors at sensitive facilities, licenses
might be required for some of them, given restrictions on materials going to sensitive
sites (particularly if the state has a history of proliferation).  It is more likely,
however, that potential recipients would use commercially available security systems,
installing them themselves.
Material Security
In the biological area, there are no international standards for pathogen security.
While rejecting the Protocol developed by BWC states, the United States has
proposed that national authorities develop such measures.46  Nonetheless, the United
States is just beginning to implement such measures in this country.47  Moreover,
even under the rubric of CTR, the United States has not been successful in
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implementing measures within Russian facilities to guard against the insider threat
of theft of pathogens.48  As many observers have noted, the sample size of biological
agents is so small that it would be quite difficult to provide 100% assurance of no
material losses.  Ken Alibek, who defected from the Soviet BW program in 1992, has
noted that some Russian BW labs required laboratory personnel to strip all their
clothes off before leaving the working zones of the building, but even this did not
prevent a few from attempting to smuggle out samples.49
Under the CWC, state parties are required to secure CW stocks and agents, and
account for quantities of specified chemicals.  Most of the verification measures,
however, pertain to destroying CW, including continuous monitoring and seals.
There is a material accounting system requiring annual reports on destruction,
transfer, and use of controlled chemicals.  Further, declared sites are subject to
challenge inspections.
In the nuclear area, measures to enhance material security in Russia and other
FSU ranged from removing material (like highly enriched uranium, HEU, in
Kazakhstan and Georgia), blending HEU down into low-enriched uranium so that it
would not be usable in a weapon, to permanent storage of plutonium, and finally, to
better material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) measures.  Where
nuclear material is no longer intended for use, it can be secured at a storage site with
tamper-proof seals, cameras, and other monitoring techniques.  When it is intended
for legitimate industrial or research processes, a system of accounting and control
that can follow material flows is used.  International nuclear safeguards rely heavily
on state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) in measuring physical
inventories of materials.  Some technical exchanges in these areas may be possible.
Some new techniques for securing material in place could be shared (one innovative
approach used in Russia was placing heavy cement blocks over plutonium
containers).  The IAEA and Sandia National Laboratory conduct programs on
physical protection of nuclear material.  It is also possible to provide equipment for
physical protection (cameras, seals, locks, or barriers) under license. 
Personnel Security
In the case of the Soviet Union, chaos and poverty combined to create incentives
for Soviet scientists to proliferate WMD technology.  The U.S. approach generally
has been to encourage them to stay in their own country and redirect their work in
non-weapons-related areas.  U.S. programs  have provided financial support through
research grants to individual scientists or through the international science centers.50
Yet, programs also need ultimately to provide secure jobs, interesting work, and an
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awareness of or commitment to nonproliferation.  Programs could also establish a
database of relevant scientists in certain states, either to target funding or to track
their activities. 
Tailoring Assistance to Countries
There is currently no coordinated plan for prioritizing expanded CTR assistance.
Table II below summarizes potential assistance to critical states in the nexus of
WMD and terrorism, divided into three tiers.  The first tier includes the three “axis
of evil” states (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq); the second includes other state sponsors
of terrorism (Cuba, Libya, Sudan, and Syria); and the third includes states with WMD
programs and terrorist activity on their soil.
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Note on Personnel: The gradation from urgent, to less urgent, to questionable (?) is based on a loose assessment
of indigenous scientific and engineering capabilities.  More urgency is accorded to states with a known
indigenous S&T base and  less urgency to states with little or no indigenous capabilities. 
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Tier I: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq
Within first “tier” (the so-called “axis of evil”) states — North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq — there may be equal emphasis placed on all four kinds of assistance.  Certainly
in the case of North Korea there is a requirement to secure weapons (if not actual
nuclear weapons, then certainly chemical and biological weapons), sites, material,
and personnel.  Many observers believe that the threat posed by North Korea with
respect to terrorists and WMD is that the regime itself would sell excess nuclear
material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium).  Given the extreme isolation of the
country, the potential for scientists “freelancing” their WMD wares is probably low.
However, North Korea might pose a similar problem as did Russia and the FSU in
the 1990s because it does not have an existing market economy.  Therefore, interim
measures might be needed to sustain former WMD workers on a broad scale.  Much
would depend on the scope of change that would allow cooperative threat reduction
measures to be implemented.  For example, one could imagine vastly different
programs depending on whether or not North Korea completely dismantled its WMD
programs, whether there was a change in government, and/or whether reunification
with South Korea was imminent.
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on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions (per Section 721 of FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act)
Iran poses very different issues.  From nuclear inspections conducted in 2003,
it appears fairly evident that although Iran had made great strides toward putting in
place the technical capabilities to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon, it is
unlikely that there are actual nuclear weapons to secure.  Following its December 18th
2003 signing of the Additional Protocol to its nuclear safeguards agreement, Iran will
be subject to enhanced inspections of its nuclear capabilities, which should help
improve nuclear site and material security.  IAEA inspections can also provide
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feedback on nuclear personnel issues, as inspectors develop relationships with
scientific personnel.  Iran is known to have chemical weapons and thought likely to
have biological weapons.  In this context, measures to secure such weapons, their
sites, and materials could be useful, if political agreement could be reached on their
eradication.  As a member of the CWC, however, declaring and inspecting weapons
before their destruction would be required.
In Iraq, the United States budgeted $900 million to the Iraq Survey Group (in
FY2003 and FY2004 supplemental requests) to find and destroy weapons of mass
destruction.  Although no actual weapons have been uncovered yet, sites and material
have been secured, and efforts are underway to provide retraining programs for Iraqi
WMD scientists, beginning with a $2M effort by the State Department to provide
alternative employment for those scientists.
Tier II: Cuba, Libya, Sudan, and Syria
Cuba, Libya, Sudan, and Syria comprise the second tier of state sponsors of
terrorism with WMD capabilities.  Of these four, Cuba and Sudan may pose less
serious WMD threats, and Libya agreed in late December 2003 to give up its WMD
programs.  Concerns over Syria’s WMD focus largely on chemical weapons.  Table
IV below breaks out these capabilities and potential areas of assistance.
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The WMD threat from Cuba focuses mostly on dual-use biotechnology
capabilities.  Although Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
Nonproliferation John Bolton has highlighted Cuba’s BW capability, some
intelligence estimates have cast doubt on both Cuba’s intentions and capabilities in
that area.  In short, the intelligence is mixed here.  If such a capability were put up for
negotiation with the United States, measures would likely focus on site and material
security.
In late December 2003, Libya struck a deal with the United States and United
Kingdom to give up its WMD programs.  Some observers believe this was prompted
by Libya’s desire to get out from under the yoke of U.S. sanctions resulting from its
support of international terrorism and the downing of the Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland; U.N. sanctions were lifted in summer 2003.  Others believe it
was prompted by the example of the war with Iraq over WMD.  Regardless, a series
of secret inspections revealed some undeclared nuclear capabilities in the uranium
enrichment area (centrifuge enrichment), which the IAEA began to inspect in the last
week of December 2003.  Libya also revealed 10-yr-old stocks of mustard agent and
some dual-use biological capabilities, but declared it had no BW program.  Libya has
been mentioned by President Bush as a candidate for the expanded CTR program,
particularly in retraining its weapons scientists.  U.S. assistance so far has focused
on securing materials and sites.  Personnel security and retraining may be a less
pressing issue, given that Libya relied heavily in all its WMD programs on outside
suppliers and thus had limited indigenous capabilities.
Sudan has featured less prominently in Bush Administration descriptions of the
threat of terrorism and WMD, and has been lauded for its counterterrorism
cooperation.  As noted earlier, the most recent CIA unclassified assessment states
that “although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan
to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad.”51 Any
assistance would likely focus on site and material security; with few indigenous
capabilities, personnel security is less likely to be an urgent issue.
Syria has a known CW program and is believed to be seeking biological
weapons.  Should it agree to give up its chemical weapons, assistance could run the
gamut from weapons to personnel security.  It is not known to what extent Syrian
scientists may have cooperated (with or without government approval) with other
states or possibly terrorist organizations.  As in other cases of repressive regimes,
however, it is possible that “freelancing” opportunities for scientists may have, until
now, been quite limited.  In the biological area, assistance could focus on site and
material security.
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Tier III: States with WMD Capabilities and Terrorist Activities
on their Soil
The table below summarizes kinds of assistance that might be critical to states
with WMD capabilities and terrorist activities on their soil, but which are not state
sponsors of terrorism.
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on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions (per Section 721 of FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act.)
In Pakistan, repeated assassination attempts on President Musharraf, allegations
and admissions of nuclear assistance to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, and a
continuous battle with terrorist elements within the country, have made Pakistan the
most crucial node of the nexus of terrorism and WMD proliferation.  In addition, a
combination of doctrinal preference (for first use of nuclear weapons) and
conventional force inferiority has given Pakistan strong incentives to forward-deploy
its nuclear forces, leading many observers to conclude that assistance to secure
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Pakistan’s nuclear warheads could be critical.52  With respect to the known nuclear
program and chemical weapons, assistance could run the range of options, from
weapons to personnel security.  Recent revelations about Pakistani assistance to the
Iranian nuclear program also have heightened longstanding concerns regarding
proliferation by prominent scientists, with or without Pakistani government approval.
Nonetheless, Pakistani officials’ repeated statements to the press about the security
of their arsenal appear to reflect a “hands-off” attitude, implying that Pakistan is quite
able to protect and secure its own weapons.53  More importantly, however, the
sensitivity surrounding nuclear weapons in the past has been such that even between
the closest of allies — for example, the United States and the United Kingdom —
proposals to share permissive action links (PALs, which only allow authorized
parties to arm the warhead) reportedly were met with disinterest.54
The proliferation potential of the Indian nuclear program appears to be less
severe than it is for Pakistan.  However, Indian suppliers have been sanctioned by the
Bush Administration for supplying chemical weapons precursors to countries such
as Iraq.55  India is currently destroying its chemical weapons under the CWC, but
some assistance could possibly help speed that process.  In both the case of India and
Pakistan, assistance in the nuclear area is likely to be severely curtailed by their non-
NPT status (see discussion on constraints).  Nonetheless, on January 12, 2004,
President Bush announced a new strategic partnership with India that would focus
on three areas of cooperation: civilian nuclear technology, space technology and
high-technology trade.56  U.S. officials reportedly stated that any space technology
must not be used in India’s ballistic missile program and civilian nuclear technology
must not be used in India’s nuclear weapons program.57
Israel fits into a similar category as India and Pakistan, but there are several key
differences.  Israel has adhered to a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear weapons
capabilities (which likely would limit its receptivity to assistance) and has not been
subject to U.S.-proliferation-related sanctions.  Israel has not ever been named as a
proliferator by U.S. government sources and few have expressed concerns about the
safety or security of its WMD arsenals.  Some assistance in securing its nuclear
program would likely be curtailed, as in the case of India and Pakistan, by
international and U.S. laws prohibiting assistance to states outside the NPT.
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Assistance in the CW and BW areas could probably focus on site, material, and
personnel security.
Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all have significant problems with terrorism
on their soil and all three are suspected of having chemical weapons capabilities.
Algeria and Egypt additionally are thought to have conducted BW research.  Algerian
and Saudi CW capabilities could be handled by the OPCW (Secretariat for the
CWC), but Egypt is not a member of the CWC.
Constraints on Assistance
There may be political, technical, and legal constraints on U.S. assistance to
some of the states mentioned above.   Above all, these countries have to be willing
to negotiate with the United States on reducing the WMD threat.  In the best possible
world, that would mean abandoning their WMD programs (like Libya has done); less
desirable would be for them to curtail such programs.  And in some cases, it may
even be difficult for countries to admit they have such programs.  States would need
to calculate the value of such WMD programs to the state’s national security,
prestige, and regional stature, the potential benefits for abandoning such programs,
and the likelihood of punitive actions by the United States (and/or the world
community) if it does not abandon such programs.  Such political constraints may
pose the most formidable hurdles to U.S. assistance. 
Technical hurdles are clearly secondary constraints, but they can lead to
questions about the effectiveness of verifying threat reduction programs.  CTR
programs in the former Soviet Union, despite political willingness to participate in
the CTR program, have been dogged for years by questions about their effectiveness
for both political and technical reasons.  Technical constraints stem primarily from
incomplete knowledge of a country’s WMD program, which makes it difficult to
scope and prioritize the proliferation problems.  Lastly, there may be legal hurdles in
providing assistance, both because of U.S. treaty obligations and domestic laws
prohibiting assistance to proliferators and state sponsors of terrorism.
Political Constraints
In some cases, no amount of pressure from the United States is likely to
convince some states to give up certain WMD programs — for example, the nuclear
programs of India, Pakistan, and Israel.  These states perceive nuclear weapons as
crucial to balancing regional security, and ultimately, to their own survival.  Barring
a change in the regional balance of power that would make nuclear weapons
unnecessary, there likely will be strong resistance to efforts to increase transparency
of those weapons programs.  And, in fact, transparency may not always improve
stability in some regions, nor may it be perceived to help a country’s national
security.  One could argue that in the case of North Korea, ambiguity has served its
national security better than the relative transparency of the Agreed Framework years.
In the Middle East, countries such as Israel, Iraq, and Iran have relied on ambiguity
or outright deception to mask their WMD programs.  In the case of Pakistan, which
has taken fewer pains to hide its nuclear program, its history of clandestine foreign
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procurement and sales of sensitive technologies could make greater transparency
politically painful.  In short, a culture of secrecy, which was not easily overcome in
the case of Russia, may be as difficult, if not more difficult, to overcome in the case
of other states.  On the other hand, professional pride on the scientific or military
levels may provide for some cooperation.
 Other countries may perceive direct and indirect benefits to foreswearing WMD
programs.  Such countries are unlikely to be lured merely by the promise of
nonproliferation assistance, but adhering to the nonproliferation regime may bring
greater political acceptance, more technical assistance in other areas, and the lifting
of sanctions.  Many observers believe that Libya was largely motivated to foreswear
its WMD programs because it was one of the last major concessions required before
lifting U.S. sanctions.  In addition, however, Libyan leaders may have perceived their
WMD programs as no longer vital to Libya’s national security, regional stature, or
prestige.  Some might argue that Libya gave up its WMD precisely because they were
not very successful programs.  This is exactly the kind of cost-benefit analysis U.S.
nonproliferation efforts seek to promote.
Assuming, whether coerced or persuaded, a country has ended its WMD
programs, some constraints may still arise.  In the case of Iraq, the U.S. search for
WMD-related items and to provide for site, material, and personnel security, has been
hampered by the chaos caused by the war and a decade of deception.  For example,
there is a significant gap in information about mid-level Iraqi WMD scientists, which
complicates decisions about who should receive assistance.  In general, incomplete
knowledge of a country’s WMD program can complicate provision of assistance.  In
the case of Russia, political willingness to accept assistance did not extend to all
areas of Russia’s WMD programs.  For example, U.S. officials have never gained
access to the four military facilities associated with Russia’s biological weapons
program.  With respect to nuclear material protection, control, and accounting
programs, most of the material, according to one report, remains outside of the
program because the United States cannot gain access to sensitive facilities.58 It is not
difficult to imagine that the same levels of secrecy encountered in the case of Russia
might be encountered in other states.  It is possible that more secrecy may be attached
to biological and nuclear weapons programs than for chemical weapons programs.
In addition, it may be possible to know about some kinds of sites (dual-use facilities
like chemical production sites, uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing) but
not others — for example, weapons machining or assembly sites.
If a country has made a decision to end one but perhaps not other WMD
programs (e.g., Pakistan decides to give up chemical weapons but not nuclear
weapons), the need to preserve secrecy about the other WMD program(s) may limit
transparency.  If a country accepts some assistance for an ongoing WMD program
(e.g., Pakistan accepts security assistance for its nuclear warheads but does not give
them up), providing such assistance could raise the question of whether the United
States tacitly accepts that WMD program.  In fact, some kinds of assistance (like
permissive action links to make nuclear weapons safe from unauthorized use) could
CRS-27
59 “A Nuclear Headache: What if the Radicals Oust Musharraf?” New York Times,
December 30, 2003.
be viewed as actively helping a WMD program and would likely be prohibited by
U.S. and international laws (see Legal Constraints discussion below). 
The existing level of cooperation between the United States and some of these
countries will likely affect some aspects of assistance.  A country that has not been
cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism may be less likely to
cooperate on nonproliferation.  On the other hand, a country like Pakistan, which has
been cooperating closely with the United States in the war on terrorism, may be given
a “free ride” on proliferation, for fear of eroding antiterrorism cooperation and
jeopardizing delicate political balances in the region. 
Technical Constraints
There are two basic technical constraints in providing assistance: getting
accurate information and being able to verify it and ensuring that assistance does not
aid or benefit a WMD capability that will continue to exist.  
Information about weapons of mass destruction programs is closely held even
in the most open of societies.  While U.S. intelligence assets can pick up remarkable
details about WMD programs, the recent U.S. government assessments of WMD
capabilities in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya point strikingly to the fact that what
we know is just a small fraction of the entire picture.  Even for advanced WMD
programs that have existed for years, details are few.  Recently a senior Bush
administration official was quoted on Pakistan’s nuclear program, saying “It’s what
we don’t know that worries us, including the critical question of how much fissile
material Pakistan now holds — and where it holds it.” 59  
Although the United States is certain that North Korea has a uranium enrichment
program, it has only been able to narrow down the location of an enrichment plant
to three sites.  For chemical and biological weapons programs, which rely on
extensive dual-use materials and facilities, there may be even fewer details on which
to base assessments.  Information from the defector Ken Alibek revealed a far more
extensive Soviet BW program than previously thought and even though the U.S.
CTR program has elements for BW site, material, and personnel security, there are
few who would agree that we know the full extent of the program even today.
In general, it may be possible to know more about material production sites than
about weapons production/assembly or weapons storage sites.  Without knowledge
of where vulnerabilities lie, it will be difficult to target even the most rudimentary
assistance.  In the case of Russia and the NIS, U.S. government officials have
complained for years that Russia has not provided the kinds of access necessary for
the United States to ensure that its goals are being met.  With respect to the material
protection, control and accounting programs, most of the material, according to one
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report, remains outside of the program because the United States cannot gain access
to sensitive facilities.60
A second technical hurdle is ensuring that U.S. assistance does not improve
WMD capabilities.  Some kinds of assistance do not run this risk — for example,
providing physical security barriers for facilities or improving personnel reliability
testing.  Improving weapon transportation and storage security, however, might run
such a risk.  Some innovations may have unintended consequences.  For example,
permissive action links, which were developed by the United States in the 1960s,
were designed so that unauthorized users would not be able to produce a nuclear
yield from the weapon.  At the same time, however, it was recognized that weapons
with PALs on them are more deployable.  Such devices, if given to India and
Pakistan in the name of decreasing the possibility that such weapons could be stolen
and used, could also increase those weapons’ operational readiness.
Legal Constraints: Treaty Obligations
Treaty obligations may play a small role in limiting assistance, both from the
perspective of U.S. obligations and for the states in question.  The relevant treaties
are the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).  The United
States is a party to all three treaties.  Each of these treaties contains language that
generally prohibits transferring such weapons, assisting, encouraging or inducing any
other state (under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states) to manufacture or acquire
weapons.  (For the text of the relevant language in each treaty, see Appendix A.)  In
addition, the United States is prohibited by the NPT from helping non-nuclear
weapon-states “control” nuclear devices (with the term “control” left undefined) and
prohibited under the CWC from engaging in preparations to use chemical weapons,
which could be broadly interpreted.
In general, questions of treaty compliance were not publicly raised by U.S.
assistance to Russia and the FSU.  Nuclear assistance to the Soviet Union, because
it was a nuclear weapons state by the terms of the NPT, was never questioned.  In the
CW area, most of the assistance to Russia has focused on helping Russia comply
with the CWC (primarily in destruction).  While some CW scientists may have
participated in the International Science Centers, there has been no public criticism
that assistance has helped the Russian CW program.  With respect to Russia’s
biological weapons program, there has been some uncertainty about whether
assistance to BW scientists in certain institutes could benefit the Russian BW
program, but no one has publicly suggested that the United States has not complied
with its BWC obligations.61
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64 “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.” Article II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  Under Article I of the NPT, the
United States is prohibited from transferring to any state (nuclear weapon state, non-
nuclear weapon state, party or non-party to the Treaty) nuclear weapons, nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly.  It
is not readily apparent what is meant by “control” over such weapons; a narrow
interpretation would focus on the ability of another state to use such a weapon.62  A
broader interpretation might conclude that better safety, security, or command and
control measures would provide another state with improved control of its nuclear
weapons, perhaps violating this obligation not to (indirectly) transfer control. 
The second part of the obligation lies in not assisting, encouraging or inducing
non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
The negotiators of the NPT reportedly intended to interpret “manufacture” broadly,
from the beginning of the acquisition cycle to the end.63  Non-nuclear-weapon states
party to the NPT are obligated not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of such weapons under Article II.64  Presumably, this would cover
assistance that enhanced command and control of weapons, including permissive
action link (PAL) technology.  India,  Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea would not
be bound by such an obligation since they are not parties to the NPT.  Iran, on the
other hand, would be bound by that obligation.
The U.S. State Department has not made a public finding on what might
constitute a violation of Article I under the NPT, but its legal advisors have examined
precedents in the application of U.S. domestic law.  In general, they have advised that
the closer assistance is attached to the nuclear weapons programs, the more likely it
could run afoul of U.S. legal obligations, both under international treaty obligations
and domestic law.  Thus, some kinds of aid (e.g., food or humanitarian aid) could be
considered, in the extreme, to be assisting or encouraging a nuclear weapons program
because they free up resources that the target government can put towards a nuclear
weapons program but are permitted in practice because they do not have a close
association with a nuclear weapons program.  If assistance took the form of
transferrable funds, however, the possibility of linkage to a nuclear weapons program
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might be considered to be greater.  Title XIII of the   FY2004 Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 108-136) prohibits the transfer of funds. 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  There are two provisions in
Article I of the CWC that might affect U.S. assistance: first, the prohibition on
engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and second, the
prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.  Although U.S.
assistance clearly would not aim to contravene the treaty, some actions, even
temporary, could be interpreted as violating that obligation if they resulted in greater
security of chemical weapons and not immediate destruction.  If weapons security
measures were implemented (e.g., security from terrorist access), they would need
to be accompanied by demilitarization measures (separation from weapon launchers,
etc.).  As evidenced by delays in the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile, destruction could take years. Any such activities with non-CWC parties
(Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria, for purposes here) could be interpreted as
falling under the prohibition against assisting, encouraging, or inducing...anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited under the Convention.
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).  As in the cases of the NPT and
CWC, a key provision here may be the prohibition on assistance, encouragement, or
inducing of any State, group of States or international organization to acquire agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery prohibited by the Convention.
Measures that included just assistance to scientists but not BW destruction, or
measures that included weapons and site security but no destruction might fall into
that category.  The likelihood is small, but future recipients may be just as reluctant
as the Russians have been to allow access to the most sensitive BW-related sites,
accepting assistance at lesser sites. 
Legal Constraints: Nonproliferation and Anti-Terrorism Laws
U.S. domestic laws contain the following restrictions that may be relevant to
providing assistance to the states covered in this report:
! restrictions on financial assistance, exports (defense and dual-use)
to states that have poor proliferation records (as recipients or
suppliers of proliferation-related goods and technology)
! restrictions on financial assistance, exports to states on state
sponsors of terrorism list
! restrictions on nuclear material and nuclear weapons cooperation
Many of these restrictions overlap in the legislation.  For example, the Foreign
Assistance Act carries prohibitions for both proliferation- and terrorism-related
activities.   Table VI below lists the key legislation.
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Nonproliferation Laws.  Nonproliferation laws generally seek to prohibit
sensitive technologies from going to states that are suspected proliferators and to
impose sanctions on states and individuals for objectionable proliferation behavior.
Many of these laws have provisions for a waiver if the President determines that U.S.
national security interests are better served by engagement rather than restrictions.
(A complete list of legislation is available in CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law,
and CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.)
In brief, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
of 1978 (NNPA) ensure that U.S. nuclear technology will not go to proliferators; for
the most part, it is unlikely that the kinds of assistance the United States might offer
under an expanded CTR program (for weapons, site, material, or personnel security)
would fall under the categories covered by these laws.  The Foreign Assistance Act
and the Arms Export Control Act punish proliferators by prohibiting U.S. military
sales and economic or military assistance.  The Export Administration Act of 1979
restricts exports of goods and technologies, including dual-use technologies, for
foreign policy and national security reasons, and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945
includes restrictions on the extension of credit for proliferation reasons.  It should be
noted that all proliferation-related sanctions against Pakistan and India stemming
from the 1998 nuclear explosive tests have been lifted; many of these constraints can
be lifted by Presidential waiver. 
Anti-terrorism Laws.  Sanctions against other countries for their support for
international terrorism are four basic types:
! ban on arms-related exports and sales
! controls on dual-use item exports (requires 30-day congressional
notification)
! prohibition on economic assistance
! miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including U.S.
opposition to World Bank, IMF loans, and ban on DOD contracts
over $100,000.65
The specific laws that contain these bans have been described in great detail in other
CRS reports.66  In general, Cuba, Libya, and Iran are all subject to comprehensive
embargoes; North Korea is subject to economic sanctions, and Sudan and Syria are
subject to specific sanctions.  In addition, Iran and Libya are subject to the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act.
Perhaps the most salient legislation is what has become known as the “state
sponsors of terrorism list,” as provided for in Section 6 (j) (1) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)l).  States can be removed from
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that list in two ways.  First, the President could submit a report to Congress certifying
that (1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government of the country concerned; (2) the government is not supporting acts of
international terrorism; and (3) the government has provided assurances that it will
not support acts of international terrorism in the future.  The second option is for the
President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed recision
will take effect, justifying the recision and certifying that (1) the government
concerned has not provided any support for international terrorism during the
preceding six-month period; and (2) the government has provided assurances that it
will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.  
In addition, however, two other “terrorism lists” may apply.  The first is Section
40 of the Arms Export Control Act, which prohibits the export of munitions to
governments that repeatedly provide support for international terrorism, and Section
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which prohibits most assistance to
countries supporting international terrorism.  Section 40 of the AECA has a specific
procedure for Congress to consider a joint resolution to block the President’s removal
of a country from the terrorism list.  Both Section 40 of the AECA and Section 620A
of the FAA include presidential waiver authority for national security interests or
humanitarian reasons. It is likely that a sweeping lift of sanctions would occur only
in the context of overall improved relations and with Congressional concurrence that
the sanctions regime ought to be undone. 
Nuclear Cooperation/nuclear Weapons Cooperation.  The Atomic
Energy Act (AEA) governs nuclear cooperation and restricts sharing of information
related to nuclear weapons.  It is unlikely that the United States would include
“significant” nuclear cooperation with any of the states in question under an
expanded CTR program (e.g., sales of nuclear reactors, nuclear material, or major
reactor components.67).  Significant nuclear cooperation with states such as India,
Pakistan, Israel, or North Korea would require that they abandon their nuclear
weapons programs and adopt full-scope safeguards.68  Moreover, Section 129 of the
AEA states that 
No nuclear material and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be
exported to: (1) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President to
have, at any time after March 10, 1978 a) detonated a nuclear explosive device;
or b) terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards; or c) materially violated an IAEA
safeguards agreement; or d) engaged in activities involving source or special
nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition
of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the President’s
judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities...
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Some states are additionally subject to country-specific restrictions on nuclear
cooperation agreements.  For example, the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of
1999 stipulated that no significant nuclear cooperation could occur with North Korea
unless relevant congressional committees were informed that North Korea: a) was in
full compliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement; b) gave the IAEA full access
to nuclear sites; c) took steps to implement the Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; d) had no enrichment or reprocessing
activities and made no significant progress in acquiring, testing, producing, or
deploying a nuclear explosive device; and e) had no nuclear weapons.  In addition,
the President must notify Congress that the transfer of key nuclear components was
in the national security interests of the United States.  Some of these requirements are
already contained in existing laws, but others are not — for example, implementing
the joint declaration.
In the event that the United States contemplates sharing sensitive nuclear
information (e.g., information related to safety and security of nuclear weapons),
Section 144 of the AEA stipulates that the Secretary of Energy may release Restricted
Data on various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle except those related to the design
or fabrication of atomic weapons. The Secretary of Defense may exchange Restricted
Data if it is necessary to a) develop defense plans; b) train personnel in employing
and defending against nuclear weapons; c) evaluate the capabilities of potential
enemies in employing nuclear weapons; d) develop compatible delivery systems for
nuclear weapons. 
The President can authorize the Secretary of Energy, with the assistance of the
Department of Defense, to exchange Restricted Data on atomic weapons with another
country provided that a) communication of Restricted Data is necessary to improve
that nation’s nuclear weapon design, development, or fabrication capability; and b)
that nation has made “substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons.”
When the language on “substantial progress” was added in 1958, the only nation that
met the qualification was the United Kingdom.  In general, most weapons-related
data, including some on safety, security, fuze and firing, are classified as restricted
data or formerly restricted data.  It is unlikely that the President would authorize such
an exchange of Restricted Data under this provision of the Atomic Energy Act,
particularly to states such as India and Pakistan.
Dual-Use Exports.  Transfers of nuclear-related equipment or nuclear
material that do not meet the requirement for an agreement of cooperation could
possibly still require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply under the Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) guidelines.  Since 1992, NSG member states have required
full-scope safeguards as a condition for supplying items on the NSG “trigger list.”69
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nuclear explosive activity, but which have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry.
See [http://www.nsg-online.org/guide.htm]. 
70 Paragraph 744.2 (d) License Review Standards for Restrictions on Certain Nuclear End-
Uses, Part 744 of Export Administration Regulations.  The assessment of nonproliferation
credentials is based on a) adherence to NPT or international nuclear nonproliferation
agreement; b) full-scope safeguards or equivalent; c) agreement for cooperation with US;
d) whether state supports nuclear nonproliferation; e) degree to which state cooperates in
nonproliferation policy; and f) intelligence data on state’s nuclear intentions and activities.
In addition, the Department of Commerce requires a license for exporting items on
the NSG’s dual-use list (those with nuclear and other applications) to states outside
the NSG.  Many of the states that could be potential recipients of U.S. CTR
assistance are not members of the NSG.
More broadly, the Commerce Control List specifies what items are regulated and
why, but an equally important consideration is the question of the end-user.  One
technique for streamlining the export control system and making it more
understandable for exporters was the development of the entities lists.  The
Department of Commerce maintains a list of entities subject to license requirements
(see Supplement 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations).  At
present, the entities of proliferation concern are located in China, India, Israel,
Pakistan, and Russia. Exports of items controlled for nuclear proliferation and missile
technology reasons are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
 Under the 1990 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), the
Department of Commerce can impose licensing requirements on exports and
reexports of goods and technology that would normally be uncontrolled where there
is an unacceptable risk of diversion to activities related to nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons or missile proliferation. U.S. exporters  are required to apply for
a license if they have knowledge of or have reason to know that such exports will be
used directly or indirectly in any one of the following activities: nuclear explosive
activities, unsafeguarded nuclear activities, or safeguarded and unsafeguarded
activities to produce special nuclear material (through reprocessing or enrichment),
produce heavy water or fabricate nuclear fuel that uses plutonium.  Section 744.2 of
the Export Administration Regulations provides eight criteria for assessing license
applications.  Potentially, the most significant of these criteria is the nonproliferation
credentials of the importing country, which include whether the state adheres to the
NPT, has full-scope safeguards, and has an agreement for cooperation with the
United States and whether the actions, statements, and policies of the state support
nuclear nonproliferation.70
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Costs and Benefits of Assistance
The United States has provided nonproliferation assistance to many countries
over many years.  In some instances, the United States funded projects or programs
because the country in question did not have the resources to fix proliferation
problems.  However, as the United States looks increasingly to bilateral “fixes,” two
questions need to be raised: are there enough resources for the United States to tackle
these multiple problems, and do bilateral approaches undermine the multilateral
nonproliferation regime?  Two potential costs of undermining international
institutions are decreased global pressure on proliferators and possibly decreased
international support for U.S. policy objectives in other areas.  A bilateral approach
may risk capturing the “easy” proliferation problems — like Libya — and
undermining support to tackle the “hard” proliferation problems — like Pakistan and
North Korea.  Without clear disarmament steps, assistance could be seen as
rewarding bad behavior, which has been a recent U.S. concern in the case of North
Korea.
Impact on Nonproliferation Regime
For states that are parties to the NPT, BWC, and/or CWC, some treaty
compliance issues may arise.  In the case of the BWC, which does not have an
inspection regime, there likely will be less controversy about bilateral inspections
superceding or undermining the treaty.  Likewise, there may be less pressure to bring
noncompliance issues to light.  For example, Russia, a party to the BWC, declared
that it had an offensive BW program in 1992, twenty years after it signed the treaty.
 In the case of the CWC, compliance issues might be handled differently.  Under
the CWC, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Israel have not openly declared
stockpiles or capabilities and yet all are suspected of having CW.  For example, if
Pakistan has a covert chemical weapons stockpile that it is willing to dismantle with
U.S. help, should Pakistan be declared in violation of the CWC?  Further, would
destruction be verified bilaterally or multilaterally under the CWC?  In the case of
Libya, the OPCW is overseeing CW destruction, but the United States has taken on
the destruction tasks related to Libya’s nuclear program.  If U.S. or other sanctions
were applicable, would they need to be waived? 
Hard-core nuclear proliferators pose a different challenge.  These states have
remained steadfastly outside the treaty regime and are unlikely to dismantle their
arsenals (with the possible exception of North Korea).  If assistance were accepted,
would this confer acceptance of their nuclear weapons status?  Would such
acceptance be good or bad for the nonproliferation regime?  Recent Bush
administration statements seem to imply an acceptance of Indian and Pakistani
nuclear weapon status.  On January 2, 2004, President Bush stated that “he believes
the [Pakistani nuclear] weapons “are secure.”  “That’s important,” he said. “It’s also
important that India, as well, have a secure nuclear weapons program.”71  On the
other hand, it is clear that nuclear weapons status will not be awarded to Iran, and
North Korea’s case still seems ambiguous.
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For some observers, the impact of assistance to “new nuclear states” on the
nonproliferation regime is moot because the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan,
Israel, North Korea, Iran, and, formerly, Libya, prove that the regime is broken.
Some observers also believe that CWC or BWC treaty compliance is essentially
impossible to verify and that new tools should be used to mitigate the threat wherever
possible. 
Issues for Congress
Sea Changes in Policy?
Many U.S. administrations have fought both proliferation of WMD and
terrorism but few have connected or coordinated the two.  A policy that seeks to
eliminate the nexus of terrorism and WMD confronts more than a few challenges.
One particular challenge is obtaining active cooperation from a diverse group of
states around the world, many of which are not traditional allies of the United States.
According to one observer, the United States hasn’t made really clear “how...a former
state supporter of terrorism stand(s) with the United States and with the rest of the
international community in dealing with that common scourge.”72  Libya may provide
an unfolding example of how a former state supporter of terrorism can be redeemed.
An equally challenging question may be how states that were considered former
proliferators stand with the United States and the rest of the international community.
 Here, Libya may not offer the best example.  Although a long-time successful
supporter of international terrorism (albeit with waning activity in the last decade),
Libya was at best a mediocre proliferator, and decided to give up both activities in
exchange for the lifting of burdensome economic sanctions.  A more troubling
example would be states that retain their WMD programs but not the stigma of being
a proliferator.  Pakistan raises the largest issue for the Bush Administration in its
matrixed war against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation: has
one goal assumed priority over the other?  There have been ample statements from
administration officials since 2001 to the effect that Pakistan has not been pressed on
its proliferation activities because of its strong support in the war against terrorism.
Despite evidence of sales of uranium enrichment equipment to Iran and Libya (and,
the Bush administration maintains, to North Korea), Pakistani proliferation activities
since 2001 are no longer reported to Congress in the semi-annual unclassified Section
721 (of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act) reports on the acquisition of
technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional
munitions.  
The sea change in nonproliferation policy can be traced to the September 2002
National Security Strategy, in which President Bush noted that “The gravest danger
our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.  Our enemies
have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction.”  A few
months later, the December 2002 Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
opened with the statement, “Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — nuclear,
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biological, and chemical — in the possession of hostile states and terrorists
represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.” [emphasis
added] Focusing on the terrorism axis has shifted policies to combat WMD
proliferation away from global approaches (at least rhetorically) to tailored
approaches.  Paradoxically, this focus on hostile states and terrorists may leave the
global community vulnerable to the proliferation activities of friendly states, whoever
those happen to be at the time.
Legislation in the 108th Congress
Two bills, which have been referred to committees, may have an impact on U.S.
assistance to some of these states.  The first is H.R. 3137 (To prohibit assistance or
reparations to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.) and the
second is S. 145 (To prohibit assistance to North Korea or the Korean Energy
Development Organization).  It is also possible that P.L. 108-175, the “Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003,” may restrict
activities.   The act calls for a ban on the export to Syria of any item on the Munitions
List or Commerce Control List.  It also calls for the imposition of two of six other
sanctions, one of which is the export of any products (other than food or medicine)
from the United States to Syria.  The law has a waiver provision if the President
determines there is a vital national security interest in doing so.  A similar bill has
been proposed in the House and Senate (H.R. 3643 and S. 1888) entitled the “Saudi
Arabia Accountability Act,” which has been referred to committee.  That bill
proposes to stop Saudi support of terrorism.
In addition, the  FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Bill (P.L. 108-199),
allows the State Department to expend $30 million of NADR (Nonproliferation,
Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs) funds on bilateral and multilateral
nonproliferation and disarmament activities, notwithstanding any other provision of
law.  Section 507 of the bill prohibits direct financial assistance of reparations to
Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, or Syria; and Section 527 prohibits bilateral
assistance to countries that the President determines as granting sanctuary to any
individual or group that has committed an act of international terrorism or otherwise
supports international terrorism.  There is a provision for a waiver for humanitarian
or U.S. national security interests reasons.
Costs
In its oversight capacity, Congress may wish to consider whether or not
expanding CTR assistance could have a “snowball” effect, particularly if the United
States insists on  using its own resources rather than existing multinational
inspectorates.  Costs of assistance are likely to be minimal the first one or two years,
but these could escalate, depending on the objectives of the program.  In the nuclear
area, the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are far smaller
than Russia’s and unlikely to incur the kinds of costs that the CTR program has thus
far incurred.  On the other hand, data are scarce on the state of nuclear materials in
those countries, so it is difficult to determine the scope and time-frame of such a
program.  At a minimum, however, such a program is likely to be incrementally
implemented.  Costs could be minimal if a quick-fix, low-technology, information-
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oriented approach is taken or they could be more substantial if a sophisticated, high-
technology approach is taken that would incorporate cameras, encryption, remote
monitoring, and other means.  The same is true in the BW and CW areas; the scope
of the undertaking in Russia greatly outweighs the combination of programs of
relevant states.  However, the management of multiple programs could present
particular difficulties.
Certifications
In 1991, the legislation that created the Nunn-Lugar program stipulated that U.S.
assistance in destroying nuclear and other weapons may not be provided to the Soviet
Union, any of its republics, or successor entities unless the President certifies to the
Congress that the proposed recipient is committed to:
! making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or
destroying such weapons;
! forgo any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense
requirements or is designed to replace destroyed WMD;
! forgo the use of fissile materials and other components from
destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons;
! facilitate U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S.
money;
! comply with all relevant arms control agreements; and
! observe internationally recognized human rights, including the
protection of minorities.
Certifications, according to some Administration officials, allow the United
States to hold the recipient states’ “feet to the fire,” providing a source of leverage.
In the view of others, however, they pose unnecessary and even dangerous delays in
implementing CTR programs.  The 108th Congress is considering legislation to
provide for a permanent waiver of CTR certifications.
It is not clear whether Congress would opt to apply the same certification
requirements to recipient states outside the former Soviet Union.  On the one hand,
it could be argued that the certification provision is written to address solely the
Soviet Union, its republics or any successor entity, and that such certifications do not
make particular sense for states outside the former Soviet Union.  On the other hand,
the concept behind the certifications may be considered by some to be valid for other
states — that is, that U.S. funding for disarmament should not proceed in parallel
with weapons production, and that disarmament  in some states, such as North Korea
and Iran, while a good thing, should not be supported unless there are assurances that
those states are not further proliferating their capabilities to other states or terrorists.
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Other Considerations
Congress may wish to consider the implications of possible provision of U.S.
assistance to countries that clearly are not democratically governed.  Section 508 of
the Foreign Operations bill (H.R. 2673) includes a prohibition on direct assistance
“to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed
by decree or military coup.”  Most of the seven state sponsors of terrorism would fall
in this category.  In addition, Pakistan has been subject to such restrictions.  On
October 27, 2001, President Bush signed P.L. 107-57, which exempted Pakistan from
existing restrictions prohibiting foreign assistance to any country governed by a
military that overthrew a democratically elected regime.  Public Law 107-57 requires
the President to determine that foreign assistance “facilitates the transition to
democratic rule in Pakistan” and “is important to United States efforts to respond to,
deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism.”73  Pakistan’s exemption was to run
out by October 1, 2003, but this was extended through the end of  FY2004 by
language in the emergency supplemental bill, P.L. 108-106.  The law raises two
pertinent issues: will President Musharraf restore democracy to Pakistan by the end
of September 2004 and if not, how would continued military leadership in Pakistan
affect U.S. cooperative efforts, particularly if new military leadership emerges?  In
the absence of regime change, similar questions might be raised about efforts
conducted with Cuba, Syria, and Libya, at least.
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Appendix A.
Relevant treaty texts relating to obligations not to assist non-weapon states in
acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons capabilities
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article I:
The NPT states in Article I that nuclear weapon states commit:
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-
nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.
Chemical Weapons Convention, Article XX 
The CWC extends the prohibition to all states, stating that 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any
circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; 
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Article III
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any State, group of States, or international
organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment, or means of delivery specified in article I of the
Convention.
